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Economic Rights of the Institutionalized 
Mentally Disabled · 
Michael L. Perlin* 
I. Introduction 
The "explosion"1 of litigation and legislation in all aspects of mental disability 
law over the past 15 years has been well documented in the caselaw, 2 in state and 
federal statutes,3 and in the law review literature.4 At least nine separate rea-
sons- some of which appear internally paradoxical - seem to have made some 
significant contribution to this explosion: 
1. The activist posture of the Warren Court in the 1960's, leading a wide 
array of minority groups to come to the federal courts in an attempt to seek 
vindication of their civil rights. 
2. The expansion of this "civil rights revolution" to include mentally disabled 
persons at a time when revelations of substandard and often-dangerous living 
conditions in state hospitals and state schools for the mentally retarded first 
truly sensitized the public to the plight of the institutionalized mentally handi-
capped. 
3. The Supreme Court's continuing fascination with all aspects of the law 
affecting the mentally disabled. 
•Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School, 57 Worth St., New York, NY 10013, U.S.A. 
The a uthor wishes to thank Mark Dennison for his helpful research assistance. 
'See La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BUFF. L. REV. 499 
(1981) . 
2See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (right to liberty); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (procedural due process in commitment decision-making) (subsequent citations omit-
ted); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305 (5 Cir. 1974) (right to treatment); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F. 2d 266 (3 Cir. 
1983) (right to refuse treatment); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (right to refuse treatment); Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (right to training). 
3See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§6001 et seq. (1986 Supp .) (Developmentally Disabled Bill of Rights Act); 29 U.S.C. 
§794 (1985) (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); 42 U.S.C. §§10801 et seq. (1986 Supp.) (Pamph, 
III); N.J.S.A. 30:4- 24. l to 24.2 (1981) (state patients' bill of rights). 
4See e.g. , LaFond, supra note I (involuntary civil commitment); Cook, The Substantive Due Process 
Rights of Mentally Disabled Clients, 7 MENT. DIS. L. RPTR. 346 (1983) (right to treatment); Brooks, The 
Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 179 (1980) 
(right to refuse treatment); Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 595 
(1983) (right to deinstitutionalization); see generally Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo, & Rogers, The Burger Court 
and Mental Health Law 4 J. LEG. MED. 323 (1985). 
See also, e.g., Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The 
Last Frontier? 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1249 (1987) (in press) [hereinafter cited as Last Frontier]; Perlin, The 
Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, 
Hidden Rationales, or 'Doctrinal Abyss'? 29 Ariz. L. Rev. I (1987). 
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4. The proliferation of state and federal statutes focusing on treatment of the 
institutionalized mentally disabled and discrimination against the handicapped 
in community settings. 
5. Changes in clinical treatment approaches and in social policy, leading 
simultaneously to the recognition that mental handicap cannot be seen as a 
monolithic all-or-nothing condition, and to the deinstitutionalization of thou-
sands of formerly institutionalized individuals. 
6. The development of an organized, coherent mental disability bar, result-
ing in proliferating caselaw, and an inevitable spillover to the rest of the bar. 
7. Developments in tort law, expanding the notion of a therapist's "dut!' to 
protect" third parties from certain mentally disabled individuals' poten~ially 
dangerous actions, coming ironically, at a time when new research techniques 
have called seriously into question the ability of psychiatrists to accurately 
predict dangerousness. 
8. Public outrage at the Hinckley acquittal, leading to a reexamination of the 
role of responsibility as an exculpatory defense in criminal law, at a time wh_en 
new social factors have been considered as possibly expanding the substantive 
bases of such defenses, and 
9. The emergence of state constitutions and statutes as independent sources 
of such rights for handicapped individuals as the legal pendulum has begun to 
shift away from expansive federal court readings of individual rights . 
As a result of these reasons - which have led both to the expansion of rights 
of the mentally disabled5 and, paradoxically, to the contraction of other rights 
(as a reflection of disenchantment on the part of the public at large and on 
the part of the federal courts with the notion of vastly expanding the civil rights 
and civil liberties of the mentally disabled)6 -there has been a remarkable pro-
liferation of cases involving almost all aspects of mental disability litigation, 
especially on behalf of the institutionalized and the formerly-institutional-
ized. 
These cases have involved the articulation of procedural due process rights, 7 
substantive due process rights,8 the right to treatment or training,9 the right to 
5The first six of the listed reasons combined to lead to the development of the caselaw cited supra note 2 and 
the statutes cited supra note 3. See generally Last Frontier, supra note 4. 
6The last three of the enumerated reasons have led to such developments as the passage of the restrictive 
Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, see 18 U.S.C. §20 (1986 Supp.), expanded duties of psychotherapists to 
protect potential victims from violent patients, see, e.g., Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of University of 
California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P. 2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1976), and Supreme Court decisions 
such as Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 104 s. Ct. 900 (1984) (expanding the scope of the 
Eleventh Amendment so as to drastically curtail federal suits against state officials in a wide variety of fact-
settings in cases seeking relief under either pendent state jurisdiction or federal statutes). But see, The 
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, P.L. 99-506, §10032 (a)(!), legislatively limiting the applicability of 
the Eleventh Amendment in cases involving federal statues prohibiting discrimination against the handi-
capped . 
Pertinent scholarship discussing Pennhurst is collected in Note, The Eleventh Amendment's Lengthy 
Shadow Over Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction : Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 34 
DEPAUL L. REV. 515 n .l (1985). 
7See, e.g., Lessard, supra. 
8See O'Connor, supra. 
9See, e.g., Wyatt, supra; Youngberg, supra. 
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refuse treatment, 10 and the right to deinstitutionalization. 11 What is surprising, 
however, is the relative paucity of litigation12 focusing on the important ques-
tions of the scope of economic rights of the institutionalized mentally dis-
abled. 13 
This lack of attention is significant for several reasons. First, there is ample 
therapeutic evidence that economic self-sufficiency is a critical determinant as 
to whether an inpatient will ultimately be reintegrated into the community. 14 
Second, as the link between homelessness and deinstitutionalization policies 
continues to be explored, 15 it becomes clearer that post-institutional poverty is 
perhaps the most important factor in determining whether a deinstitutionalized 
patient will be added to the growing roster of the nation's homeless. 16 Third, 
while there have been extensive commentaries- by lawyers and mental health 
professionals alike - on virtually every facet of such mental disability issues as 
procedural due process rights, 17 treatment rights, 18 and the scope of the right to 
10See Rennie, supra; Rogers, supra. 
"See Pennhurst, supra. 
12C/. Perlin & Siggers, The Role of the Lawyer in Mental Health Advocacy, 4 BULL. AM . ACAD. 
PSYCH. & L. 204, 209 (1976) (advocacy office's law reform caseload showed "clear pattern in . . . progres-
sion from procedural cases to substantive cases to economic cases"). See also Perlin, Ten Years After: 
Evolving Mental Health Advocacy and Judicial Trends, 15 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 335, 338 (1986-87) 
(over past decade, "the first legal awakening of interest in the whole notion of economic rights" has devel-
oped). 
13Contrarily, the Supreme Court has paid some important attention to economic issues of great significance 
to mental health providers. See, e.g., Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 459 U.S. 465 (1982) (consumer 
antitrust suit could be maintained where she alleged Blue Shield and state psychiatric association conspired to 
refuse reimbursement for certain visits to clinical psychologist); see generally Perlin, Recent Developments in 
Mental Health Law, in 6 Sadoff ed., PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 539, 547-548 
(1983). 
14This issue has been explored most extensively in the context of litigation centering around the question of 
a patient's right to be paid for institutional labor following the decision in Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 
808 (D.D.C. 1973) (minimum wage provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) apply to most 
institutional labor at public mental institutions). See, e.g., Perlin, The Right to Voluntary, Compensated, 
Therapeutic Work: A New Theory in the Aftermath of Souder, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 298 (1976) ("Right 
to Work"); Friedman, The Mentally Handicapped Citizen and Institutional Labor, 87 HARV. L. REV. 567 
(1974); see also, e.g., King v. Carey, 405 F. Supp. 41, 44 (W.D.N. Y. 1975). 
While the continuing vitality of Souder was sharply questioned following the Supreme Court's decision in 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (aspects of the FLSA extending minimum wage 
protections to state employees held unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment), National League has since 
been overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), raising the 
question as to whether the Souder methodology might yet be resuscitated. For a recent revisionist view of the 
appropriateness of applying FLSA provisions to patient labor, see Blaine & Mason, Application of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act to Patient Work Programs at Mental Health Institutions: A Proposal for Change, 27 
B.C. L. REV. 553 (1986). 
"See, e.g., Mills & Cummins, Deinstitutionalization Revisited, 5 INT'L J. L . & PSYCHIATRY 271 (1982); 
Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY 
L.J. 375 (1982). 
16See, e.g., Lipton & Sabitini, Constructing Social Support Systems for Chronic Patients, in Lamb, ed., 
THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 153, 156 (1984); Williams et al., Deinstitutiona/ization and Social 
Po/icy: Historical Perspectives and Present Dilemmas, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 54 61-64 (1980). Cf. 
Saphire, The Civilly-Committed Public Mental Patient and the Right to Aftercare, 4 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
232, 288 (1976): "Many patients remain in confinement because they are too poor to be released." 
17 See, e.g., LaFond, supra note I. 
18See, e.g., Cook, supra note 4; Brant, supra note 4. 
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refuse treatment, 19 the journals have been virtually silent on the entire topic of 
economic rights of the institutionalized mentally disabled. 
This Article will consider some of the underdiscussed economic issues of 
significance to the institutionalized mentally disabled and their families: (1) the 
right of the mentally disabled to control their own assets while institutiona-
lized;20 (2) the right of the committing authority to bill such individuals (and/ or 
their families) for "care and maintenance" during institutionalization;21 (3) the 
limitations on the appointment of representative payees to manage the finances 
of certain patients,22 and (4) the interplay between state billing statutes and 
other federal laws suggesting that certain governmental benefits may not be 
"attached" by state authorities. 23 
Examination of these cases should reveal the extent to which economic rights 
issues have been considered carefully by the courts, the doctrinal principles (if 
any) that have been developed, the interplay (if any) between these cases and 
the other patients rights developments previously discussed, and the future 
paths which litigation and scholarship in this area can reasonably by expected 
to take. 
II. The Right of the Institutionalized to Control Their Own Assets 
Although the issue has not been litigated extensively,24 it appears to be rela-
tively well settled that institutionalized mentally disabled persons cannot be 
deprived of the right to control their own assets absent a finding of incompeten-
cy consistent with rudimentary due process safeguards. 25 
t9See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 4; Brant, supra note 4. 
20see Part II, infra. 
21 See Part III, infra. 
22see Part IV, infra. 
2JSee Part V, infra. 
2•cJ Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S . 715, 737 (1972) ("Considering the number of persons affected, it is 
perhaps remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations on [the civil commitment] power have not 
been more frequently litigated") (footnotes omitted). 
In the otherwise-exhaustive and seminal 2300-page, three volume set of reference books published in I 979 
by the Practising Law Institute and the Mental Health Law Project (MHLP), there is thus virtually no 
mention of economic rights of patients. See 1-3 Friedman, ed., LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DIS-
ABLED PERSONS (P.L. I. 1979). And, in the just-published, similarly-exhaustive two volume set of refer-
ence books-published by the MHLP for the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems-
there is but one brief three-page note as to issues involving cost of care of institutionalization. See 2 MHLP, 
eds., PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE LABELLED MENTALLY ILL 597 
(1987). 
2ssee, e.g., Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974), further proceedings 426 F. Supp 
1297 (E .D. Pa. 1977), afj'd 558 F. 2d 150 (3 Cir. 1977), cert. den. 434 U.S . 943 (1977); McAuliffe v. Carlson, 
377 F. Supp. 896 (D. Conn. 1974), suppl. 386 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1975), rev'd on other gds. 520 F. 2d 
1305 (2 Cir. 1975), cert. den. 427 U.S . 911 (1976). See also, Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Connell, No. 
83870 (N.J., Hudson City. Ct., Dec. 2, 1975) (county court vacated order which would have attached, for care 
and maintenance, all income of county hospital patients in excess of $25 per month, and ordered individual 
hearings on the appropriateness of such assessments), discussed in "Right to Work," supra note 14, at 338 
n.183. 
On the other hand, many states with "Patients' Bills of Rights" include statutory provisions granting 
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. In the lead case of Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 26 the district court was faced 
With the question of a Pennsylvania statutory scheme21 which enabled the state 
to summarily28 seize and control assets and property of certain29 mental patients 
and the? apply portions of those assets to cover the costs of the patients' car; 
and mamtenance while institutionalized. 30 
Afte: finding that the division in the statutory scheme31 violated the equal 
Protect10n clause (in that it was "irrational, arbitrary and ... wholly unrelated 
to any purpose of the law in which the classification is made"), 32 the court 
turned to plaintiff's procedural due process arguments. Preliminarily, it noted 
that t~e d~fe~dants (state officials) conceded that "'men!al patients are, barring 
a~ ad3ud1cat10n of incompetency, capable of managmg their financial af-
fa~r~,"'33 and that apparently-uncontested expert testimony concluded that "de-
Pnvmg mental patients of any control and responsibility over their own funds 
institutionalized mentally disabled persons the right to control and to manage their own personal property 
and money. See, e.g., Mich Stat. Ann. §14.800 (730) (3), (4) (1980) (except where denial is "essential in order 
to prevent the [patient] from unreasonably and significantly dissipating his assets," a patient "is entitled to 
easy access to the money in his account and to spend or otherwise use the money as he chooses"). See Beis, 
MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 183-184 (1984). For an overview of all statutes, see Lyon, Levine & 
Zusman, Patients' Bills of Rights: A Survey of State Statutes, 6 MENT. DIS. L. RPTR. 185 (1982), and Lyon-
Levine, Levine & Zusman, Developments in Patients' Bill of Rights Since the Mental Health Systems Act, 9 
MENT. & PHYS. DIS . L. RPTR. 146 (1985). 
26377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974), further proceedings 426 F. Supp. 1297 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd 558 F. 2d 
l50 (3 Cir. 1977), cert. den. 434 U.S. 943 (1977). 
2750 Pa. Stat . §§4424, 4501 (1966). 
28See, e.g., 50 Pa. Stat. §4424 (I) (1966) ("The authorized agent . . . shall, without application lo any 
court, take custody of, receive and manage ... any money or other personal property in [certain patients'] 
Possession ... ") (emphasis added). See infra note 29, for a discussion of which patients were covered by this 
Provision . 
29Under the statutory scheme, two classes of patients were "created" for the purposes of due process 
safeguards: patients who had not been adjudicated incompetent (who were denied prior notice and hearing 
Pri~r to seizure of their assets), and patients who had been adjudicated incompetent who were afforded such 
notice and hearing. Vecchione, 377 F. Supp. at 1363. 
. These classes were further separated on the basis of the amount of assets belonging to individual patients; 
if an incompetent patient had more than $2500 in assets, a guardian would be appointed; if he had less than 
that amount, however, the failure to provide for notice and hearing meant that such patients "generally ha[d] 
no guardian or court to protect their assets." Id. 
30See generally Part III, infra. 
3
'See supra note 29. 
32 Vecchione, 377 F. Supp. at 1369. The court noted that the state could point to "no rational basis, not even 
revenue raising," id. at 1368, to justify the classification, which it characteriz~d as "coun~er-~,rod~ctive and 
Intemally inconsistent with the goals of the (Mental Health Procedures] Act . and as_ berng arbitrary_ and 
capricious." Id. Cf, e.g., Mernitz, Private Responsibility for the Costs of Care m Public Mental lnsfttuftons, 
36 IND.L:J. 443, 444 (1961) ("[U]p-to-date procedures for the determination ~nd _en~orce~ent of private 
responsibility can greatly enhance attempts to secure substantial revenues from rnst1tut1onahzed persons or 
their families.") 
In light of its finding that the state law did not meet the minimum rationality test of_ the equal protection 
clause, the Vecchione court found it unnecessary to consider. whether "fundamental nghts and/ or suspect 
cl~ssifications require a strict scrutiny test in this case. Id. at 1369 n.11. Cf City o(Cleb_urne, Tex. v. Cleburne 
~
1Ving Center, 105 s. Ct. 3249 (1985) (applying rational basis test to case rnvolvrng mentally retarded 
individuals). 
33 Vecchione, 377 F. Supp. at 1367 (quoting from Partial Transcript, at 58). 
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would tend to prolong a person's stay in a mental hospital, while giving them 
such control and responsibility is therapeutic."34 
With this backdrop, the court found the statutory sections in question un-
constitutional in that they failed to provide appropriate procedural due process 
safeguards. 35 The income and governmental benefits36 "intercepted and appro-
priated" by defendants were matters of "statutory entitlement to plaintiff," and 
thus to be treated as property entitled to constitutional protection under the due 
process clause.37 
This analysis was further buttressed by analogy to a Second Circuit case 
which had found that a state's failure to provide adequate notice prior to the 
appointment of a committee to disburse a patient's assets was unconstituti~n-
al;38 where a state "does not even provide a judicial hearing, let alone notice 
thereof [, a] fortiori the practice . .. must be set aside as violative of the Due 
Process Clause."39 
The court specifically rejected defendants' argument in support of the prac-
tice in question: that there is often an immediate threat of "destruction, loss or 
mismanagement ... by this type of plaintiff."40 First, even if this practice was 
"generally justifiable under the facts," the statutes in question were overly 
broad,41 and, in some cases, irrebuttable.42 
Second, and, in the court's view, more fundamentally, the factual underpin-
ning of this argument-that mental patients are "presumptively incapable of 
handling their own funds [ - ] has been stripped by the record in this case."43 As 
the court had rejected defendants' hypothesis that mental patients may be 
presumed less competent to handle their own assets than the public at large, 
"there is no legitimate justification for the [defendants'] interference with plain-
tiff's custody and control of her property without an adjudication that she was 
incompetent to manage it. 44 
i•Jd. at J.367, and see cited sources. 
See also, e.g., Koe v. Califano, 573 F. 2d 761, 763 n .5 (2 Cir. 1978): 
SSI payments make possible the purchase of items essential to any human existence transcend-
ing bare subsistence. The loss of such payments imposes a readily understandable burden; less 
obvious but perhaps no less significant are the uncertainty and feelings of rejection inflicted by 
the continuous threat of deprivation on those who have so little and are mentally ill. 
i s Vecchione, 377 F. Supp. at 1370, citing, inter alia, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S . 67, 82 (1972). 
J6Defendants had summarily seized social security benefits of plaintiff's "without notice and hearing or 
explanation." Id . at 1365. Plaintiff argued that, absent a knowing voluntary and intelligent assignment of 
such benefits, they were "insulated from claims of creditors, including the state" under both federal statute 
(42 U.S.C. §407 (1970)) and case law (Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd. , 409 U.S . 413 (1973)). /d. at 1366. 
See Woodall v. Bartolino, Civil No . 85-1781(MTB) (D.N .J., Oct. 24, 1985), discussed in Part V, infra, for a 
general discussion of the question of the application of §407 and Philpott to institutionalized mental patients. 
i,Vecchione, 377 F. Supp. at 1370, citing, inter alia, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). 
JBDale v. Hahn, 486 F. 2d 76 (2 Cir. 1973). 




•i/d. at 1372. 
44for a general discussion of post-Vecchione procedures, see Tartaglia v. Com., Dept. of Public Welfare, 
416 A. 2d 608, 612 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1980). Vecchione was followed in a parallel case involving Veterans' 
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In a different factual context, 45 another federal district court similarly struck 
~own as unconstitutional a Connecticut statute which authorized the state 
fmance ~ommissioner to serve as conservator of funds of any mentally ill 
person with property or annual income of less than $5000 committed or admit-
ted to a state mental institution. 46 As such hospital admission "does not support 
even a presumption that a mental patient is incompetent,"47 the state's irrebutt-
able presumption of incompetency violated due process. 48 
. Because the statute exempted persons with more than $5000 in assets, it also 
violated the equal protection clause as it was "irrational to think that all or even 
most state mental patients without real property and income of more than 
$5000.00 are incompetent."49 
III. Right to Bill for "Care and Maintenance" 
(A) Authority to Bill Patients 
The majority of involuntary civil commitment statutes require that the insti-
tutionalized mentally disabled person (or a legally responsible relative) pay for 
son:ie percentage50 of the person's cost of institutionalization. 51 These statutes52 
vanously stipulate payment for, inter alia, "care, transportation and treat-
Administration benefits in In re Grcich, 492 Pa . 210, 423 A. 2d 347, 350 n.7 (Sup. Ct. 1980), cert. den. 450 
U.S. 997 (1981). 
The practical impact of Vecchione has been questioned in Burgdorf, ed., THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF 
HANDICAPPED PERSONS 562 (Paul R. Brookes 1980) (all of the first 179 due process hearings held in 
conformity with Vecchione decree led to declarations that patients were incompetent to handle their own 
Property). For the appellate decision in one such case, see Matter of Caine, 490 Pa . 24, 415 A. 2d 13, 14 n.2 
(Sup. Ct. 1980). 
45McAuliffe, supra, was brought by a patient who was transferred to a mental health facility from a city 
correctional center, where he had been serving a term of imprisonment following a felony conviction . 377 F. 
Supp.at 898. · 
46Id. at 904. Plaintiff had argued that this statute deprived him of his "civil rights to enter and enforce 
contracts, settle and enforce obligations or make gifts of his property without the essential safeguards of 
notice and an opportunity to be heard on this issue of his competency." Id. 
47Id., citing Winters v. Miller, 446 F. 2d 65, 68 (2 Cir. 1971), applied specifically in Connecticut in Logan v. 
Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265, 1269-1270 (D. Conn. 1972). 
'
8Id. at 905 . 
49Id. Subsequently, the Second Circuit reversed on Eleventh Amendment grounds a supplemental order 
Which had directed defendants to return certain property to plaintiff. See 520 F. 2d 1305 (2 Cir. 1975), rev'g 
386 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1975). 
sosee Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV. 945, 946 
0 959); Mernitz, supra note 32, at 466, and id. n.82 (only IOOJo of actual costs recovered). 
51 Developments in the Law- Civil Commitment, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1365 (1974) ("Developments"), 
and see, for a sampling of statutes, id. n.221 . See, for a detailed description of two contrasting acts (Virginia's 
a_nd West Virginia's), Note, West Virginia's Reimbursement Statute: The f!idden C~sts of In_stitutionaliza-
tion, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 12l, l29-l33 (1982), and see, for a thorough histoncal overview, Mermtz, supra note 
32. 
52For an analysis of why these statutes generally may increase in importance in the near future (because of 
expected diminution of alternative federal funding sources and a "change in public attitude toward the 
economically disadvantaged"), see Note, 85 w. VA. L. REV., supra note 51, at 134. 
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ment,"53 "care and treatment,"54 "service and treatment,"55 and "examination, 
maintenance, and treatment."56 
In addition, the payment responsibility statutes are often unclear as to the 
employment of a mechanism by which a patient's precise liability can be as-
sessed;57 various statutes and regulations mitigate assessments based upon "clin-
ical reasons,"58 "substantial hardship,"59 "ability to provide for payment,"60 being 
"reasonably able to pay,"61 or having "sufficient financial ability."62 Statutes 
variously incorporate specific pay schedules63 and mandate that state mental 
health departments adopt regulations to set up such standards. 64 
While such statutes have been challenged on a variety of grounds, they have 
been regularly upheld against substantive attack; 65 however, in some instances, 
courts have struck down provisions for violations of procedural due process 
rights. 66 
Thus, courts have uniformly rejected statutory challenges which have raised 
the argument that the distinction between mental patients (who must pay) and 
prisoners (who are not so billed) violates the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,67 or that they impermissibly delegate legislative au-
thority to state executive agencies. 68 
One the other hand, courts have examined carefully the way such statutes are 
invoked, and have both struck down provisions which failed to provide for 
sJA laska Stat. §47.30.9 10 (a) (1985). 
s•vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 18, §8 101 (1985 Supp.). Under the Vermont law, the patient (or a legally responsible 
relativ~) must pay or contribute to the payment "in such manner and proportion as the commissioner [of 
Mental Health] shall determine to be within [his] ability to pay"). 
sswyo. Stat. Ann. §25-10-202 (a) (1985). 
l6Ariz. Rev. Stat. §36-545 .01 (1974). 
l7"Developments," supra note 51, at 1366. 
ss55 Pa. Code §4305.7 (b) (3) (1985). Abatement will be granted under this section only where (I) the 
imposition of the maximum liability would be likely to "negate the effectiveness of treatment, or prohibit the 
client's entry into treatment," and (2) the failure to provide such treatment "would result in serious harm to 
the client's welfare or in greater cost to this Commonwealth due to deterioration of the client's condition." See 
generally, Faix v. Com. Dept. of Public Welfare, 499 A. 2d 411 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1985). 
s9See 55 Pa. Code §4305.7 (2) (1985), discussed in Faix, supra. 
60See, e.g., A laska Stat. §47 .30.910 (a) (1985). 
6'See, e.g. D.C. Code Ann. §21-586 (b) (1981). 
62See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §64-7-6 (1978). 
6JSee, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. §246.511 (1982). 
64See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §25-10-202 (a) (1985). 
For a philosophical inquiry into the relationship between the reimbursement mechanisms and prevailing 
public attitudes toward the mentally ill, see Mernitz, supra note 32, at 481-482. 
65See, e.g., infra notes 67-68. 
66See, e.g., infra notes 69-71. But see, Hospital Services, Inc. v. Farnsworth, 393 N.W. 2d 446 (N.Dak. 
Sup. Ct. 1986) (statute of limitations inapplicable in suit against former patient); see generally on statute of 
limitation questions in cases involving patients' estates, Part Ill(C), infra. 
61Faye v. Stapley, 607 F. 2d 858, 863 (9 Cir. 1979), collecting cases. Cf Department of Mental Hygiene v. 
Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 388 P. 2d 720 (Sup. Ct. 1964), vacated 380 U.S . 194 (1965), on 
remand 62 Cal. 2d 586, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 400 P. 2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (challenge to imposition of liability 
on certain relatives of institutionalized patients upheld on state constitutional grounds). 
68See, e.g., State ex rel. Macey v. Johnson, 296 P. 2d 588, 589-590 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 1931) (collecting earlier 
cases). 
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adequate personal notice69 or for a hearing10 for institutionalized persons who 
had never been declared legally incompetent, and have ordered trials to deter-
mine whether a patient actually received notice of a petition seeking to require 
maintenance payments. 11 
Courts have also considered whether such maintenance charges against pa-
tients may be sustained on an unjust enrichment theory. In a case where pa-
tients were committed illegally, 72 the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected that 
specific argument: 
Because the [commitment] proceedings were not adequate to sustain 
a finding that the individuals were in need of care and treatment, 
regardless of the fact that they may have been in need of such care 
and treatment, there was no valid commitment order. Thus, the 
plaintiffs cannot be considered "committed" for any purpose, and 
they do not fall under the literal reading of [th~care and maintenance 
statute]. 73 
Finally, a court has rejected the argument of a patient's guardian seeking to 
raise the question of the reasonableness of the charges assessed against his ward 
while a state hospital resident, in a state where he alleged that "reasonable 
value"74 was the statutory test for reimbursement. 75 Although the guardian 
wished to introduce evidence to show that profit-making private institutions 
were charging from 20 to 33% of the state's charges for providing "the same 
care and treatment that the public institution furnished,"76 this would not be a 
proper topic for inquiry at a maintenance hearing: 
69Foundation for the Handicapped v. Dep't of Social and Health Services, 97 Wash 2d 691, 648 P. 2d 884, 
887-888 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Duffy v. Dep't of Social and Health Services, 90 Wash 2d 673, 585 P. 2d 470 (Sup. 
Ct. 1978). 
70McConaghley v. City of New York, 60 Misc. 2d 825, 304 N.Y.S. 2d 136, 137-138 (Civil Ct. 1969). 
71Fayle, 607 F. 2d at 862. 
72See Stale ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W. 2d 573 (Sup . Ct. 1977), invalidating a ll 
Milwaukee County commitments during the relevant time period for violations of the patients' right to 
counsel and right to jury trial. 
13lankowski v. Milwaukee County, 104 Wis. 2d 431,312 N.W. 2d 45, 48 (Sup. Ct. 1981). On the question 
of the "benefits" that plaintiffs may have received, the court made this observation: 
Plaintiff makes this cogent argument in his petition for review before this court: "OF what 
value is a bed on a locked ward to a person illegally deprived of access to his/ her own home? To 
a person who is not mentally ill, of what possible benefit is treatment such as psychotropic 
medication? And of what use is occupational therapy to one whose illegal commitment has 
prevented him/ her from going to work? To presume that the services were of value to plaintiffs 
ignores the grossly defective procedures by which they were committed and the importance of 
the due process protections for fair and correct judicial determinations. 
Id. n.5. 
14Cal. Civil. Co. §38 (1982). The statute in question, first enacted in 1872, reads: 
A person entirely without understanding has no power to make a contract of any kind, but he is 
liable for the reasonable value of things furnished to him necessary for his support or the 
support of his family. 
(Emphasis added) . 
15/n re Estate of Gridley, 32 Cal. App . 3d 268, 108 Cal. Rptr. 200 (Ct. App. 1973). 
16Gridley, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 208. 
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[Ilf each person liable under the law as constitutionally applied were 
permitted to question the price of pills, nursing and psychiatric se~-
vices, room and board, by adducing the testimony of an expert of his 
choice in separate actions for the recovery of charges, the situation 
would be chaotic. [Analogizing to the test77 employed in cases involv-
ing special assessment proceedings, "thel final decision ... is con-
clusive unless attacked on the ground of fraud or mistake .. • • " 
If there is graft, fraud or gross inefficiency which is pushing u~ ~he 
actual costs of the services in question the matter is one to be rectified 
by governmental action prodded by a vigilant public . . . [TJhe 
charges determined in accordance with the statutory mandate should 
control, in the absence of evidence showing that the determination 
itself was erroneous because of some dereliction of duty by the offi-
cer computing them, or because he acted in an arbitrary or discrimi-
natory manner. . . . 78 
(B) Authority to Bill Relatives 
Most modern cases79 have held that statutes imposing liability upon ~he es-
tates of relatives of institutionalized mentally disabled persons for their care 
and maintenance are a legitimate exercise of legislative power. 8° Courts ~ave 
been willing, however, to consider "competition" between (or among) re_latives 
and the impact of post-hospitalization divorce on liability in such circum-
stances. 81 
(1) Upholding Authority 
Cases which uphold statutes imposing liability on relatives date to the Eliza-
bethan Poor Laws of Great Britain82 and are generally based on the theory that 
such a law "merely recognizes the imperfect moral obligation [to support an 
institutionalized relative] and makes of it a legal one."83 The historical basis for 
such holdings is reflected in the words of a nineteenth century decision: 
It can hardly be said that there is no moral duty whatever imposed 
upon a man, who has sufficient financial ability consistently with his 
duty to himself and to others, to supply the necessaries of life to a 
brother or sister who is unable to earn a livelihood in consequence of 
11See Larsen v. San Francisco, 182 Cal. 1, 14, 186 P. 757, 763 (Sup. Ct. 1920). 
1BGridley, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 208-209. 
79For an overview of earlier cases, see Annotation, Constitutionality of Statute Imposing Liability Upon 
Estate or Relatives of Insane Person for His Support in Asylum, 20 A.L .R. 3d 363. 
80See generally, Part llI (B)(l), infra. This view is not unanimous, however. See, e.g., Department of Mental 
Hygiene v. Kirschner, 60 Cal. 2d 716,388 P. 2d 720, 26 Cal. Rptr. 488 (Sup. Ct. 1964), vacated, 380 U.S. 194 
(1965), on remand 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P. 2d 381, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1965), discussed at Part III 
(B)(2), infra . 
81 See Part lll (B)(3), infra . 
82See 43 Eliz. c.2 §7 (1601), cited in Beach v. Gov't of the District of Columbia, 520 F. 2d 790, 792 n.4 
(D.C.Cir. 1963). Most contemporaneous American statutes are "little more than a paraphrase of . • • the 
Elizabethan poor law." Mernitz, supra note 32, at 452. 
83State v. Bateman, 110 Kan . 546, 204 P. 682 683 (Sup . Ct. 1922). 
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bodily infirmity, idiocy, lunacy, or other unavoidable cause ... The 
object of both the statute of Elizabeth and of our existing statute is to 
protect the public from loss occasioned by neglect of a moral or 
natural duty imposed on individuals, and to do this by transforming 
the imperfect moral duty into a statutory and legal liability. 84 
197 
With this backdrop, most courts disposed quickly of constitutional chal-
lenges by patients' relatives. First, arguments based on state constitutional 
provisions requiring state support of such institutions were rejected on the 
theory that such sections did not mandate the provision of services to patients 
at the sole expense of the state. 85 Second, equal protection claims premised on 
both the state and federal constitutions86 arguing that patients' relatives were 
being doubly taxed have been denied as "specious" because of the "special 
relationship" between the patient and his relative. 81 Third, challenges based on 
the theory that liability laws constituted special or class legislation (since they 
differentiated between patients confined in state hospitals and those housed 
elsewhere) have similarly been turned back on the theory that "the distinction 
between the helpless and those able to help themselves is a natural one [that] 
pervades the laws of all civilized countries."88 Also, arguments premised on an 
improper delegation theory89 have been rejected where courts have found that 
the statutory provisions in question contained reasonable standards to properly 
guide the administrator charged with their effectuation.90 
Also, in upholding another liability statute in face of a due process challenge, 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals limited the relative's liability only as 
to that date on which hospital authorities first demanded contributions from 
him (as opposed to the time, soon after her commitment, when the patient's 
own assets were depleted) .9' On the other hand, an Indiana intermediate appeals 
court ruled that a change in the "responsible relatives" statute did not abrogate 
a father's responsibility for his son's care and maintenance prior to the effective 
date of the amendment. 92 
84People v. Hill, 163 Ill. 186, 46 N.E. 796, 798 (Sup. Ct. 1896), as quoted in Beach, 320 F. 2d at 792-793 
(footnote omitted). See also, e.g., In re Idleman's Commitment, 146 Or. 13, 27 P. 2d 305 (Sup . Ct. 1933); 
Commonwealth v. Zommick, 362 Pa. 299, 66 A. 2d 237 (Sup. Ct. 1949). 
85State Rev. Div. of Dept. of Treas. v. Estate of Raseman, 18 Mich. App. 91, 170 N.W. 2d 503, 506 (Ct. 
App . 1969) (Raseman); see also, e.g., State v. Kiesewetter, 37 Ohio St. 546 (Sup. Ct. 1882); Kaiser v. State, 80 
Kan. 364, 102 P. 454 (Sup. Ct. 1909), construing similar provisions; see also Department of Public Welfare v. 
Haas, 15 Ill . 2d 204, 154 N.E. 2d 265, 270-271 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (rejecting challenge based on state's constitu-
tional provision mandating a "thorough and efficient" education); see generally, Levine v. Institutions and 
Agencies Dept. of N.J., 84 N.J. 234, 418 A. 2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1980), criticized as "unfortunate[)" in Note, 85 
W.VA. L. REV., supra note 51, at 126. See also Levine, 84 N.J. at 268, 269 (Pashman, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for having "completely abdicated its fundamental responsibility of constitutional 
judicial review," and for a result which "diminishes the meaning of our common humanity"). 
86See, e.g., Department of Mental Health v. Coty, 38 Ill. 2d 602, 232 N .E. 2d 686 (Sup. Ct. 1967). 
87Raseman, 170 N.W. 2d at 506-507. 
88In re Yturburru's Estate, 134 Cal. 567, 66 P. 729 (Sup. Ct. 1901). See also State v. Troxler, 202 Ind. 268, 
173 N.E . 321 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Wigington v. State Home & Training School, 486 P. 2d 417,420 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 
1971). 
89See Part IIl(D), infra. 
90Kough v. Roehler, 413 Ill. 409, 109 N.E. 2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1952). 
91Beach, 320 F. 2d at 794 . 
92Estate of Hinds v. State, Mental Health Commissioner, 390 N.E. 2d 172, 173-174 (Ind . Ct. App. 1979). 
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(2) Denying Authority 
On the other hand, in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner,93 the 
California Supreme Court has held that a state statute94 imposing liability upon 
a daughter for the care and maintenance of her mother in a state psychiatric 
institution violated the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it 
selected one class of persons for a "species of taxation [with] no rational basis 
support[ing] such classification."95 
In examining the issues, the court studied the relevant historical back-
ground,96 and carefully distinguished cases upholding spousal liability9'; in such 
cases, "the basic obligation and relevant status of the husband arose from the 
marriage contract to which he was a consenting party."98 Also, the court consid-
ered what it characterized as "the social evolution which has been developing 
during the past half century," which has brought "expanded recognition of the 
parens patriae principle ... and other social responsibilities . . . and divers 
other public welfare programs to which all citizens are contributing through 
presumptively duly apportioned taxes."99 
Because the state Supreme Court did not clarify whether its ruling was pre-
mised on the equal protection clause of the federal or state constitution, the 
United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. 100 
On remand, the state Supreme Court stated that, while the cognate state and 
federal provisions "provide generally equivalent but independent protections," 101 
it made its determination of unconstitutionality "by our construction and appli-
9360 Cal. 2d 716, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 388 P. 2d 720 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
94Cal. Welfare & Instns. Co. §6650 (1965) ("The husband, wife, father, mother, or children of a mentally ill 
person ... shall be liable for his care, support, and maintenance in a state institution of which he is an 
inmate ... " 
95Kirchner, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 492. The statutory section in question has been repealed, see Cal. Stats. 1967, 
c.1667, p. 4107, §36.5, and has since been replaced by Cal. Welfare & Instns. Co. §7275 (1984), which 
contains nearly-identical language. Later developments in Kirchner are discussed infra, at text accompanying 
notes 104-108. 
Although the party who litigated the Kirchner case was the administratrix of the daughter's estate, see 
generally, Part III (C), infra, the case is being discussed in connection with relatives' liability since that is by 
far the most significant aspect of the case for further analysis . 
96Id. at 489 n.4. 
91 Id. at 490, discussing Guardianship of Thrasher, 105 Cal. App. 2d 768,234 P. 2d 230, 235-236 (Ct. App. 
1951) . 
. 9BKirchner, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (emphasis in original). The court also relied on its prior decision in 
Department of Mental Health v. Hawley, 59 Cal. 2d 247, 28 Cal. Rptr. 718, 379 P. 2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1963), see 
infra note 144, holding that recovery could not be had as against a father of a criminally-committed patient. 
For equal protection purposes, this decision was "dis positive" of the case before it, the Kirchner court found• 
Id . 
99Id. at 491 . 
Kirchner is criticized rigorously in Comment, Compulsory Contribution to Support of State Mental 
Patients Held Deprivation of Equal Protection, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 858, 863 (1964); see also, In re Dudley, 
239 Cal. App. 2d 401, 48 Cal. Rptr. 790, 794 n.8 (D. Ct. App. 1966) (listing commentary criticizing 
Kirschner). 
100Department of Mental Hygiene of California v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965). 
101Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 3d 586, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330, 400 P. 2d 321 (Sup. 
Ct. 1965). See generally "Last Frontier," supra note 4. 
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cation of California law" and not "by compulsion of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."102 
Kirchner was followed 103 in a subsequent case involving the liability of a 
parent of an institutionalized mentally ill adult, 104 and was distinguished where 
a separate statutory scheme controlled the imposition of parental liability for 
the care and maintenance of a mentally incompetent adult daughter in a state 
facility for the retarded. 105 Elsewhere, the California courts have declined to 
extend its holding to cases involving spousal liability106 or the obligation of a 
parent to a minor child. 101 
Finally, much of the precedential persuasiveness of Kirchner was diminished 
by a California Supreme Court case upholding a state law requiring adult 
children to reimburse the state for certain welfare aid made to their non-institu-
tionalized parents, 108 over the vigorous dissent of two judges (who had joined in 
Kirchner) that the decision effectively overruled the Kirchner holding. 109 
Also, courts have looked carefully at the claims by relatives that their proce-
dural due process rights have been violated by the means by which such costs of 
maintenance were determined. Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court struck down 
a state law110 because it failed to (1) provide for notice of hearing on the rela-
tives' request for a new determination of liability, 111 (2) designate a hearing 
officer or examiner to make a determination as to liability "either from evidence 
or the submitted information,"112 or (3) provide legislative standards or guide-
lines for the appropriate exercise of rulemaking power. 11 3 
102Id. 
103See also Hospital Services, Inc. v. Brooks, 229 N.W. 2d 69, 72 (N . Oak. Sup. Ct. 1975), generally 
following Kirchner in declaring unconstitutional state statute requiring children to pay for parents' care at 
state hospital. 
10•Department of Mental Hygiene v. Bank of America N. T. & S.A., 3 Cal. App. 3d 949, 83 Cal. Rptr. 559 
(Ct. App. 1970). 
1osDudley, supra. See also, In re Estate of Preston, 243 Cal. App. 2d 803, 52 Cal. Rptr. 790 (D. Ct. App. 
1966), distinguishing Kirchner in case involving guardian of incompetent mentally retarded institutionalized 
ward with substantial assets. 
106Department of Mental Hygiene v. O'Connor, 246 Cal. App. 2d 24, 54 Cal. Rptr. 432, 434 (D. Ct. App. 
1966); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kolts, 247 Cal. App. 2d 154, 55 Cal. Rptr. 437,441 (Ct. App. 1966) 
("It is clear that ... Kirchner refused to equate the basic obligation of the husband arising out of the 
marriage contract with an adult daughter's obligation to support a parent"). 
101see County of Alameda v. Kaiser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 815, 48 Cal. Rptr. 343 (D. Ct. App . 1966) (not denial 
of equal protection to impose upon mother liability to county for medical services rendered to minor son in 
county hospital), and County of A lameda v. Espinoza, 243 Cal. App. 2d 534, 52 Cal. Rptr. 480 (D. Ct. App. 
1966) (upholding parent's statutory obligation to support minor child committed to county institution). 
1osswoap v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 10 Cal. 3d 490, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 516 P. 2d 840 (Sup. 
Ct. 1973). 
109See id., 111 Cal. Rptr. at 160 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). The impact of Swoap on the holding in Kirchner 
is considered carefully in Hospital Services, Inc., 229 N.W. 2d at 72- 75. 
110Miller v. State, Dep't of Treas. (Rev. Div.), 385 Mich. 296, 188 N .W. 2d 795 (Sup. Ct. I 971). 
'"Cf Powell v. Comm. Dept. of Public Welfare, 455 A. 2d 1287, 1289 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1983) (appellant 
has burden of proving right to abatement or modification of assessment of liability). 
112Miller, 188 N.W. 2d at 798. See also, e.g., In re McVey's Estate, 170 Neb. 362, 102 N.W. 2d 632, 634 
(Sup. Ct. 1960) (requiring investigation and determination of relative's ability to pay). 
113Miller, supra. The court noted that the state statute contained "no legal requirements or provisions to be 
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(3) Other Issues 
Other cases have considered subsidiary issues arising out of the impact of 
divorce proceedings both as to allocation of liability as between potentially-
responsible relatives and as to spousal liability. 114 In a New York case involving 
an institutionalized juvenile, where separate hearings were held in an effort to 
assess liability of the juvenile's divorced parents and maternal grandfather, 115 the 
court ordered an "integrated proceeding" with notice to all parties, along with 
an opportunity for "mutual cross-examination."11 6 • 
Elsewhere, in an ingenious, but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to avoid 
liability, a patient's wife argued that, while she had grounds to divorce her 
husband prior to his commitment, she declined to initiate such proceedings 
because of her religious beliefs, and that, thus, the state relatives' liability 
statute amounted to a constitutionally-impermissible preference given to per-
sons whose choice of religion permits divorce .11 1 The court rejected this ar~u-
ment as "clearly without merit," noting that the statutes "contain nothing which 
even remotely purports to impair religious freedom." 11 8 
(C) Authority to Bill Estate 
As with claims against relatives, 119 most cases have held that statutes imposing 
liability on the estates of institutionalized mentally disabled persons are valid 
exercises of legislative power, although at least one recent case has limited the 
scope of liability so that the survivors' "legitimate needs and comforts" would 
still be provided.120 
An early case rejected an estate administrator's argument that the state was 
estopped from making demands on the estate because it had originally paid a 
share of the patient's costs when hospitalized: when the state "acts of its own 
volition, in response to the dictates of humanity, in the performance of a 
governmental duty now recognized as resting upon a modern state and for the 
good of the individual concerned," the elements of estoppel are not present. 121 
applied to the facts by the Department of Revenue in redetermining liability" and operated "with an uncon-
trolled discretion." Id . 
Miller was a sharply-split 4-3 decision. In a lengthy dissent, Judge Brennan argued that the act satisfied 
minimal constitutional requirements "since it produces generally fair results and establishes a classification 
which bears a reasonable relationship to [its] object . . . "188 N.W. 2d at 798, 81 I. 
•••See, e.g., State, Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Wiedemann, I Ohio App. 3d 27, 437 
N.E. 2d 1212, 1214-1215 (Ct. App. 1980) (where parents are both obligated to pay for institutional care of 
minor child, question of what share each of two divorced parents should pay is matter to be determined from 
divorce decree). 
115 ln the state statute then operative, the juvenile's father, mother and grandparents were all potentially 
responsible for support depending on their "comparative resources and equities." See Department of Welfare 
of City of New York v. Mallory, 20 A.D. 2d 884, 248 N.Y.S . 2d 805, 806 (App. Div. 1964), construing N. Y. 
Family Ct. Act §415 (1983). 
11 6/d. 
117Department of Mental Health v. Warmbir, 37 Ill. 2d 267, 226 N.E. 2d 4, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1967). 
11 8/d. at 5, 6. 
11 9See Part lll(B), supra. 
•2°Chill v. Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement Commission, 429 So . 2d 574, 586 (Miss . Sup. Ct. 1983). 
121State v. Romme, 93 Conn. 571, 107 A. 519, 520 (Sup . Ct. Err. 1919). 
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More recently, a South Carolina court held that the state had a valid claim 
against an estate's administrator, finding that care and maintenance in a state 
facility is not "unconditional charity but is based upon expectations of future 
reimbursement if the circumstances should thereafter permit."122 
In Chill v. Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement Commission, 123 the Mississip-
pi Supreme Court found that the state's power to require reimbursement for 
care and treatment was "carefully limited," especially where the patient was 
committed involuntarily. 124 Concluded the court: 
As long as the State of Mississippi limits such commitments to those, 
and only those, truly in need of mental treatment, and as long as the 
state confines its mental patients under humane conditions and pro-
vides minimally adequate care and treatment, it is not unreasonable 
to require the patient, his family or his estate to pay at least a part of 
the bill. 125 
The court considered carefully the administrator's argument that, because 
the patient's initial commitment in 1953 violated his procedural due process 
rights, the state's current reimbursement claim cannot withstand due process 
scrutiny. 126 After examining the past decade's "explosion of litigation" regarding 
the substantive and procedural due process rights of mentally disabled persons, 
the court conceded that it was "[w]ithout doubt [that the patient] was denied 
both substantive and procedural due process at the time of his [1953] commit-
ment."121 
In the context of the proceedings before the court, however, this merely meant 
that the state agency was required to "prove [the] fact anew" that the patient 
"was in fact mentally ill and in substantial need of institutionalization," proof 
that was offered at the hearing below. Procedural due process would be satisfied 
if "the estate [were] afforded a reasonably adequate adversary hearing before an 
impartial judicial officer at which time [the state agency] had to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence each factual point requisite to the substantive 
validity of its reimbursement claim."128 
The court noted, however, that, under state statute, reimbursement claims 
could not be asserted "beyond ability to pay," and that the "plight of relatives or 
dependents must be considered in determining [such] ability."129 Under this 
122Minter v. State Dep't of Mental Health, 187 S.E. 2d 890, 893 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 1972). See also In re Estate of 
Klimko, 111 Misc. 2d 411, 444 N. Y.S. 2d 391 (Surrogate's Ct. 198 I) (state not precluded by its reduction or 
waiver of fees from seeking retroactive reimbursement from estate, where claim concededly reflected charges 
for care received). 
123429 So. 2d 574 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1983). 
124Id. at 576, 579. 125Id. See also id. at 579-580, surveying other jurisdictions where similar powers have been upheld, and id. 
at 581-582, collecting cases from other jurisdictions specifically allowing for recovery of similar expenses 
from an estate even where the patient was committed prior to the passage of the estate reimbursement act. 
126Chil/, 429 So. 2d at 582. 127Id. at 584. 
128Id. at 584. After examining the evidence, the court concluded that the estate's administrator "received full 
procedural due process." Id. at 585. 
129Id. at 586, citing Miss. Code Ann. §41-7-79 (1972). See also, Wigington v. State Home and Training 
202 MICHAEL L. PERLIN 
legislative policy, trial courts must allow for the provision of "the legitimate 
needs and comforts of the patient and his or her dependents or surviving 
relatives" as an "absolute priority" over state claims. 130 
Other cases construing similar claims have dealt with various procedural and 
substantive aspects of applicable estate law. Thus, where a state initially failed 
to seek full reimbursement for a patient's care, that failure did not serve as a 
waiver of the state's right to seek full reimbursement from the estate after t_h_e 
patient's death. 131 Elsewhere, courts have split on the question of the applicab1h-
ty of statutes of limitations and statutes of nonclaims to claims filed by state 
entities against estates132 and have generally held that a state can reach and 
recover from a trust of which an institutionalized person is a beneficiary. 133 
Finally, at least one court has considered the question of priority of liens in a 
case involving a piece of land owned by an incompetent patient in a state mental 
health facility. 134 There, the state supreme court remanded a lower court decision 
establishing lien priority because it was clear that the patient had the ability to 
pay each of them in full. 135 
(D) Authority to Bill "Criminally Confined" Patients for 
Their Care and Maintenance 
To some extent, special rules have developed in the analysis of cases of 
patients whose institutionalization was originally precipitated by some involve-
ment with the criminal justice system: either pursuant to a finding of incompe-
tency to stand trial (1ST), to a determination of "not guilty by reason of insani-
ty" (NORI), or following either arrest or apprehension on criminal charges. 136 
Schoof, 486 P. 2d 417, 421 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1971) (reversing judgment because of a "nearly ... complete 
vacuum" as to whether estate was "able to pay" during relevant periods). 
130/d. at 586-587. CJ State v. Morris, 303 S.W. 2d 802, 803 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1957) (where patient 
inherited $ I 0,000 twenty years after his initial commitment, court denied state claim for reimbursement of 
prior services and treatment rendered, but indicated that money could be seized only to pay for treatment 
rendered after the date of the inheritance). 
'
3
'Gass v. State Department of Mental Hygiene, 23 A.D. 2d 329, 255 N.Y.S . 2d 314 (App. Div. 1965). See 
also _In re Estate of Gnerre, 87 Misc. 2d 700, 386 N. Y.S. 2d 763 (Surrogate's Ct. 1976) (no waiver where state 
previously accepted money at a lesser rate of payment). 
'
32Compare State v. Stone, 271 S.W. 2d 741 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1954) (statute of limitations inapplicable), 
and see also Gnerre, 386 N.Y.S. 2d at 765, to State, Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. 
Koblentz, 2 Ohio App . 3d 278,441 N.E. 2d 820 (Ct. App. 1981) (statute of limitations applicable), and State 
ex ref. Griffin Mem. Hosp. v. Reed, 493 P. 2d 815, 818 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1972) (statute of nonclaims 
applicable). 
Statutes of nonclaims are discussed in Reith v. County of Mountriaf, 104 N.W. 2d 667, 670-671 (N.Dak. 
Sup. Ct. 1960) and in State v. Cracker's Estate, 38 Ala. App. 306, 83 So. 2d 261 (Ct. App. 1955). See 
generally Griffin Memorial Hosp., supra. 
'
3
~See 41 Am Jur 2d, Incompetent Persons, §58 at 597; on pertinent trust issues generally, see Third 
National Bank in Nashville v. Brown, 691 S.W. 2d 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). · 
At least one court has suggested that the decision to invade a trust should be based upon the chances for the 
patient's recovery and ultimate release. See Commonwealth v. Sharrett, 218 Va. 684, 240 S.E. 2d 522 (1978). 
'
34Clarendon Holding Co. v. Witherspoon, 201 S.E. 2d 924 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 1974). 
135/d. at 927. 
136T~e distinction between 1ST and NGRI has been blurred in at least one case, where a defendant was 
commttted following a plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity" until such time as he "is no longer insane." 
Hawley, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 719-720. While no finding was ever made with respect to this plea, the court 
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(]) ISTs 
Courts construing claims made by patients hospitalized pursuant to a finding 
of incompetency to stand triaP 37 have generally found that such patients may be 
billed for their care and maintenance while so institutionalized, as such a pa-
tient is neither "under the direct control of the criminal authorities"138 nor a 
convict, 139 nor is the commitment seen as being punitive in nature. 140 Elsewhere 
even though a patient was under the continuing control of a court with criminai 
jurisdiction as well, the fact that her commitment followed a finding of mental 
illness made it appropriate to subject her to the same sort of financial liability 
as a "civil" patient. 141 
(2)NGRis 
Courts are split, however, on the question of whether such charges can be 
assessed against patients committed following a finding of not guilty by reason 
of insanity. 142 Although not all of these decisions reflect the most precise and 
detailed analysis, the disposition of these cases seem to reflect generally wheth-
er the court views the rationale of the commitment as treatment for benefit of 
the patient or protection for the benefit of society. 143 
(a) Upholding statutes assessing charges 
In Matter of Guardianship of Nelson, 144 the guardian of the estate145 of a 
patient who had been committed to a state psychiatric hospital following an 
insanity acquittal appealed from a trial court order mandating payment of the 
patient's "care and maintenance" while hospitalized, 146 on the grounds that the 
construed it as an admission of the underlying charge (of which there appeared to be no factual doubt) which, 
"but for M'Naughton type insanity, would affect the crime charged." Id. at 720. 
137See generally Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S . 715 (1972). 
138Commonwealth Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Jenkins, 297 S.E . 2d 692, 695 
(Va. Sup. Ct. 1982). 
139State v. Kosiorek, 5 Conn. Cir. 542, 259 A. 2d 151, I 52 (App. Div. 1969). 
140Id. 
141 State ex rel. Mental Health Commissioner v. Guardianship of Wiseman, 393 N.E. 2d 235, 237 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1979). See also, In re Estate of Schneider, 50 Ill . 2d 152, 154, 277 N.E. 2d 870 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (trial 
competency proceeding "for the protection of [the patient's) constitutional rights to due process and for his 
benefit - not for the protection of the public"). 
142The constitutionality of commitment procedures following an NG RI finding has been the topic of 
significant caselaw development and strenuous debate over the past decade. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 
463 U.S. 354 (1983); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A. 2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1975). 
143But see Note, 85 W. VA. L. REV., supra note 52, at 124 (distinctions between involuntarily committed 
civil patients and patients committed via the criminal process "unsound if both groups are deprived of their 
liberty under state mandated procedures"). 
14498 Wis. 2d 261,296 N.W. 2d 736 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
145See generally Part IIl(C), infra. 
146Under the then-operative statutory scheme, a person "receiving care, maintenance, services and supplies 
provided by any institution in this state ... shall be liable for the cost of the care, maintenance, services, and 
supplies ... "Wis. Stat. Ann. §46.10 (2) (1979). The one exception to this statute exempted persons over the 
age of 18 in "prisons." Wis. Stat. Ann. §46.10 (2m) (1979). See Nelson, 296 N.W. 2d at 737-738. 
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statutorily-mandated disparate treatment147 of insanity acquittees and prisoners 
was arbitrary and capricious. 148 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected his argument that the statutory 
scheme violated the equal protection clauses of either the state or federal consti-
tutions, reasoning that (1) such a statute need only satisfy the rational basis test 
(since fundamental rights were not implicated), 149 and (2) the "supplies, services 
and care"150 received by prisoners differed from those received by mental pa-
tients.151 
The statutory exemption for prisoners was "justifiable as a legislative distri-
bution of the economic burdens of institutional care," the c~mrt reasoned, 
noting that there was both a "theoretical and factual difference" in the services 
received by prisoners and other institutionalized persons: 
Theoretically the prisoner is incarcerated as a measure to prevent 
harm to the public. Restrained of his liberty, he is not free to commit 
criminal acts. This is an historic and a primary reason for the exist-
ence of prisons. Factually, the services rendered to the prisoner are 
not geared to return him to a state of mental or physical health. They 
are geared to sustain him on a day-to-day basis while he serves out his 
term ... ,s2 
On the other hand, persons receiving care and services in a non-penal institu-
tion "share a common trait [: the receipt of] care and services which inure 
primarily to their benefit as opposed to the benefit of the public."153 While the 
confinement of some of this group of persons "will be of some value to society 
[, t]his benefit ... may reasonably be viewed as secondary to an overriding 
purpose of treatment to benefit the individual."154 Such a difference provides "a 
reasoned ground for the exemption given the prisoners,"155 and the constitution-
ality of the statute was thus upheld. '56 
In a companion case, the state Supreme Court also found that the statutory 
scheme-which vested in the state Department of Health and Human Services 
the power to determine from whom payment will be sought and in what 
141See supra note 146. 
148Nelson, 296 N.W. 2d at 740. 
149/d. at 739, relying on Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S . 656,660 (1973) (statute operates in areas of econom-
ics, social welfare). 
,sosee supra note 146. 
1l 'Nelson, 296 N.W. 2d at 740-741. 
152/d. at 740. 
l l l[d. 
154/d. But cf., Jones, 463 U.S. at 364, quoting Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 714 (1962) ("The fact that 
the accused was found to have committed a criminal act [as established in Jones by the verdict of not guilty by 
reason of insanity] is 'strong evidence that his continued liberty could imperil "the preservation of the 
peace" '"). 
155Nelson, 296 N.W. 2d at 740. This distinction has been relied upon elsewhere. See State ex rel. Dorothea 
Dix Hospital v. Davis, 27 N.C. App. 479, 219 S.E. 2d 660 (Ct. App. 1975) (Davis). 
156/d. at 740-741. The court noted that "[v]irtually every reported decision" came to a similar conclusion on 
the equal protection question. Id. at 741 n.5, and see cases cited. But see Part IIl(D)(2)(b), infra. 
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amount-did not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. 157 As it 
was established state law that such a delegation will be upheld "if the purpose of 
~he delegating statute is ascertainable and there are procedural safeguards to 
msure that the board or agency acts within that legislative purpose,"158 it was 
"clear beyond doubt" that the statute in question - reflecting "clear and well 
defined" policies and purposes159 -should be upheld. 
Elsewhere, in another case with a similar fact-setting, 160 a court has rejected 
the argument that the assessment of such charges amounted to a tax in viola-
tion of state and federal constitutional provisions requiring uniformity and 
reasonableness in the mode of tax assessments. 161 As the statutory cost of "care, 
treatment and maintenance"162 was placed on all patients, it did not impose a 
non-uniform tax; 163 also, the statutory cost was "not characteristic of a tax at 
all," but rather represented "compensation for services rendered ."164 
(b) Upholding challenges to statutes 
On the other hand, the state courts of Connecticut have struck down statutes 
imposing liability on persons found NORI on the theory that there was no 
reasonable ground to differentiate between insanity acquittees and "ordinary 
prisoners ."165 There, where the statutory scheme specifically made no distinc-
tion between NORI patients and those civilly committed, 166 the court found 
several critical differences between the two categories which proved fatal to the 
classification for the purposes of a rational basis inquiry. 167 
First, under the state laws which controlled at the critical time periods, 168 the 
touchstone of a civil commitment was mental illness and fitness for treatment; 
an insanity acquittee, however, could not be released from confinement absent a 
finding as to his dangerousness to self or others. 169 While a court could not 
157Matter of Guardianship of Klisurich, 98 Wis. 2d 274, 296 N.W. 2d 742, 744-746 (Sup. Ct. 1980). See 
also, e.g., Davis, 219 S.E. 2d at 663. 
1581d. at 745, citing, inter alia, State (Dept. of Admin.) v. ILHR Dept., 77 Wis. 2d 126, 134, 252 N.W. 2d 
353 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
1591d. at 745, 746. 
1601n Davis, the defendant had been committed to a state hospital following an insanity acquittal. 219 S.E. 
2d at 662. 
'
6
'ld. at 663. 
162N.Car. Gen. Stat. §143-117 (1983) provided that all patients admitted to Dorothea Dix Hospital "are 
hereby required to pay the actual cost of their care, treatment, training, and maintenance." 
1631d. at 663 . 
1641d. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that payment was "a taking of private property 
without just compensation" as he actually received the services for which payment was sought. Id. at 664. 
165State v. Reed, 192 Conn. 520,473 A. 2d 775, 780 (Sup. Ct. 1984); State v. Miller, 192 Conn. 532,472 A . 
2d 1272 (Sup . Ct. 1984). For earlier developments in Connecticut, see McAuliffe, supra. 
'
66Conn. Gen. Stats. §I 7-317 (1975) provided that "the expense for the support and treatment of [a] person 
[found NGRI who has been committed for confinement or treatment] shall be computed and paid for in the 
same manner as is provided ... for patients committed by courts of probate." See Reed, 473 A. 2d at 776 
n.2 . 
167 Id. at 778-78 I. 
' 68See Conn. Gen. Stats. §17-178 (1975), since substantially rewritten, see Conn. Gen. Stats. §17-178 
(1985). Cf O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); see generally Fasulo v. Ara/eh, 173 Conn. 473, 378 
A. 2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
'
69Reed, 473 A. 2d at 779. 
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interfere with a hospital decision to release a civilly-committed patient, an 
insanity acquittee could only be released with court approval, "Unlike one 
whose mental illness has never been manifested by performing a criminal 
act, ... the focus of the inquiry with respect to the acquittee is upon the 
protection of the community, the same consideration which is of primary con-
cern in relation to the imprisonment of persons convicted of crimes."110 
Although the court conceded that there were some differences between NORI 
patients and prisoners as to stigma, as to allocation of jurisdiction as between 
executive agencies, and as to release mechanisms, these "have no particular 
relevance to the propriety of requiring an insanity acquittee to pay for the same 
services which are provided to an ordinary prisoner without charge, because 
they are not related to comparative financial ability or need for treatment."111 
Finally, the court distinguished cases from other jurisdictions which had 
rejected equal protection challenges172 since it did not appear "that the statutory 
criteria for commitment or release of persons confined by order of the criminal 
court differed from those applicable to civil commitments."173 
Elsewhere, a state statute providing that the costs of hospitalization of an 
NORI patient were taxable against the state rather than the patient was upheld 
in light of a constitutional attack by the Director of the State Department of 
Public Health and Welfare, 174 the court rejecting the plaintiffs argument that 
the statute violated a state constitutional provision which barred "grants or 
gifts" by the authorization of "free hospital treatment to individuals of 
means."115 
The fact that the NORI patient was automatically committed116 to the state 
hospital (because of the state's "interest and obligation . . . to protect the pub-
lic against dangerous individuals") 177 -with the attendant permitted "by-pass of 
a person's usual right to a [due process] hearing"178 - made it "[clear that] this is 
not a case where the State is making a simple gift of medical services."179 
(C) Following arrest or apprehension 
Finally, New Jersey's state courts have ruled that cost of care and mainte-
nance must be paid in two other circumstances involving the criminal process. 
In the first, a trial court ruled that persons transferred from county jails to state 
hospitals following arrest and detention on criminal charges were so obligated, 
170/d. at 780 (emphasis added). 
1111d. 
1721ncluding, inter alia, Davis, supra. See Reed, 473 A. 2d at 781. 
17l/d. 
174 Robb v. Estate of Brown, 518 S.W. 2d 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). The statute before the court in Robb was 
subsequently amended so as to make the patient or his estate responsible for costs of hospitalization in cases 
following "acquittal because of lack of responsibility due to mental disease or defect," see Rev. Stat. Mo. 
§552.080.3(2) (1980), upheld in State ex rel. Foltz v. Ahr, 666 S.W. 2d 777, 779-781 (Ct. App. 1983). 
175Robb, 518 S.W. 2d at 735, paraphrasing Mo. Const'n, §38(a), Art. III. 
176See Jones, 463 U.S . at 361-372. 
177Robb, 518 S.W. 2d at 735. 
178/d. at 736. See generally Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1975), and Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 
(1980). 
119/d. 
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r_eas??ing that a contrary ruling might enable individuals to escape financial 
~1~b1hty for hospitalization by electing to not post bail (and thus be eligible for 
Jail-hospital transfers). 180 
In the second, and most unusual case, liability for care and maintenance was 
upheld by the state Supreme Court in the case of an individual who after 
having previously been civilly committed and institutionalized in a civil hospi-
tal, was transferred to a maximum security facility for the "criminally insane" 
after _he allegedly assaulted and killed two other patients in the civil hospital, 
notwithstanding the fact that no criminal prosecution for homicide was con-
templated. 181 
IV. Representative Payee Status 
Both federal1 82 and state183 statutes provide for the appointment of representa-
tive payees to manage the monetary benefits of beneficiaries determined inca-
pable of managing certain of their own assets. 184 A pre-existing finding of the 
beneficiary's legal incompetency is not always essential under the language of 
the federal provisions if it "appears . .. that the interest of an applicant enti-
tled to a payment [of social security benefits] would be served thereby."185 
In upholding the constitutionality of the federal scheme, the Tenth Circuit 
construed the Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge186 to hold that 
the due process clause does not require prior notice and an opportunity to 
contest when an institutionalized Social Security beneficiary is alleged to be 
incompetent and incapable of managing his own affairs. 187 
After ruling that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required, the 
court applied the three-part balancing test of Eldridge, 188 and determined that 
180In re Truslowe, 42 N.J. Super. 23, 125 A. 2d 741, 745 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1956). 
181 State v. Le Vien, 44 N .J. 323, 209 A. 2d 97 , 99 (Sup . Ct. 1965) (quoting letter from county prosecutor to 
State Attorney General). 
182See 42 U.S.C. §4050) (1985 Supp.); see 20 C.F.R. §404.2001 to .2065 (1985). 
183See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stats. §§210.290 (1982), 387.620 (1984), construed in Commonwealth v. Cabinet for 
Human Resources, 686 S.W. 2d 465 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984), and Rev. Co. Wash. 72.33.670 (1982), construed in 
Duffy v. State, Dep't of Social and Health Services, 90 Wash 2d 673, 585 P. 2d 470 (Sup. Ct. 1978). 
184See, e.g., McGrath v. Weinberger, 541 F. 2d 249, 251 (10 Cir. 1976), cert. den. 430 U.S. 933 (1977). See 
generally MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES (3d ed. 1983), §15 at 20-
21; 3 SOCIAL SECURITY PRACTICE GUIDE (Matthew Bender 1985), §§22.01 to 22.07 at 22- 1 at 22-13 
(Practice Guide); BLOCH, FEDERAL DISABILITY LAW AND PRACTICE. (1984), §4. 14, at 252-255 . 
The "representative payee" scheme is described in detail in Jordan v. Heckler, 744 F. 2d 1397 (10 Cir. 1984), 
suppl. proceeding 808 F. 2d 733 (10 Cir. 1987) (mandating periodic accounting by payees). . 
18542 U.S.C. §405 (j) (1985 Supp.); see generally, 20 c.F.R. §404.2001 (1985), and especially, 20 C.F.R. 
§404.2001 (b) (2) ( 1985) ("We may appoint a representative payee even if the beneficiary is a legally competent 
individua l"). See also 20 C.F.R. §404.2065 (1985) (providing account ing procedures to be followed by repre-
senta tive payee, a nd establishing mechanism for submission of periodic written reports) . 
186424 U.S. 319 (1976) . 
187McGrath, 541 F. 2d at 253-254. 
188/d. at 252-253. 
[F]irst , the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the 
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no such prior hearing was required. First, it distinguished the facts of Eldridge, 
which involved the termination of benefits, from the case in question, which 
dealt with "a deprivation of free use of benefits." Since there was no due process 
violation in Eldridge (which allowed termination without a prior hearing), "it 
would be an unwarranted departure on our part" to order such a hearing in a 
case involving "no termination of benefits."189 
Second, it characterized the risk of erroneous deprivation of the beneficiary's 
interest in the free use of his benefits as "relatively slight" or "minimal," adding 
that it would be "unwarranted conjecture" to speculate that t11,e evaluations of 
incompetency made by hospital staff and Social Security psychologists reflected 
"anything other than a sincere determination" that the appointment of a repre-
sentative payee would serve the "best interests" of the beneficiary. Third, it 
concluded that the governmental interest was "substantial," both as to time and 
expense and as to administrative expedience. 190 
Substantively, other representative payee cases have considered: (1) the role of 
the payee in applying a patient's assets to institutional care, (2) the need for 
actual notice prior to a determination of financial responsibility191 to a patient 
with a payee but without a legal guardian, and (3) the appropriateness of the 
appointment of the state agency with supervisory powers over the patient as the 
payee. 
While it is clear that money paid to a representative payee belongs to the 
beneficiary, 192 and that the payee is accountable for payments made to him on 
account of his beneficiary, 193 there is some authority194 to suggest that the payee 
may be compelled to apply social security benefits to provide for the patient's 
care and maintenance while institutionalized. '95 
function involved and the fiscal or administrative burden that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirements would entail. 
424 U.S. at 335. 
1s9McGrath, 541 F. 2d at 253 . 
190Jd. at 253-254: 
We agree with the government's contention that requiring a prior hearing would place it in "the 
anomalous position of either paying benefits to a person who is incapable of managing these 
benefits or, on the other hand, holding up all benefit payments until a capability hearing is 
rendered." 
(citation omitted). 
On the other hand, the Social Security Administration will "generally" notify beneficiaries of its decisions 
and will given them some sort of opportunity to object to proposed action. See Bloch, supra note 184, at 253, 
and see 20 C.F.R. §404.2030(a) (1985). 
191See Part Ill(A), supra. 
192State v. Kosiorek, 5 Conn. Cir. 542, 259 A. 2d 151, 154 (App. Div. 1969), citing 42 U.S.C. §405(j). 
193Jd. at 154-155, citing 20 C.F.R. §404.1609 (predecessor to 20 C.F.R . §404.2041 (1985)). 
19•But see Part V, infra. 
i9SKosiorek, 259 A. 2d at 155, citing 20 C.F.R. §404.1606 (predecessor to 20 C.F.R. §404.2035 (1985)): ("It 
is considered in the best interests of the beneficiary for the ... person to whom payments are certified on the 
beneficiary's behalf to allocate expenditure of the payments so certified in a manner which will facilitate the 
beneficiary's earliest possible rehabilitation or release from the institution or which otherwise will help him 
Jive as normal a life as practicable in the institutional environment"). But see, Woodall v. Bartolino, Civil No. 
85-1781(MTB) (D.N.J., Oct. 24, 1985). 
ECONOMIC RIGHTS 209 
C?n the other hand, provision of notice of a financial responsibility determi-
?at10n hearing solely to a payee violates due process in cases where "the patient 
Is not subject to any legally declared disability."196 First, such a representative is 
not "the equivalent of a legal guardian"; second, even though the patient's 
Property is "in the hands of the representative payee, [it] is still [the patient's] 
Property" and "no determination regarding that property can be made without 
notice to him or a legally appointed guardian."'97 
Finally, an intermediate state appeals court'98 has construed state statutes' 99 
establishing priorities in the appointment of payees to allow for the designation 
0
~ a state human services department "as a matter of last resort,"200 and thus 
remstated a trial court determination so appointing the Cabinet for Human 
~es_o~rces as payee where it found that there was "no other available and willing 
md1v1dual or entity to assume such [a role]."201 
V. Attachment of Government Benefits to Pay 
for "Care and Maintenance" 
A significant issue which has not been extensively litigated202 is the question 
of whether a patient's Social Security benefits may be attached by a state or 
county government to pay for the care and maintenance of an institutionalized 
mentally disabled person, in light of a federal statutory provision which appears 
to totally bar such attachments. 203 
Under 42 U.S.C. §407(a) (1983) ("§407"): 
The right of any person to any future payment ... shall not be 
transferrable or assignable, at law or in equity,. and none of the 
moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall 
be subject to execution, levy, attachment, or other legal process . 204 
'
96Duffy, 585 P. 2d at 474. 
'
97/d. Cf McCormick, supra note 184, at 20-21 (where a beneficiary was found NGRI and subsequently 
committed to a state hospital [which was appointed representative payee on his behalf], such an NGRI finding 
was not an adjudication of insanity for all purposes, and the Social Security Administration would undertake 
to determine whether the beneficiary was capable of managing his own benefits and whether direct payments 
should be made directly to him, citing Soc. Sec. Ruling 73-29). 
'
93Commonwealth v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 686 S.W. 2d 465 (Ky. Ct. App. l984)-
'99See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. 387.600(1) (1984). 
200Cabinet For Human Resources, 686 S.W. 2d at 468 . 
• 
201 Id. See also, e.g., Estate of Peter c., 488 A. 2d 468, 470 (Me. Sup. Jud . Ct. 1985) (statute barring 
institution housing incapacitated persons from serving as guardian does not automatically bar its employees 
from being so named) . 
. But see Practice Guide, supra note 184, §22.03[2], at 22-4 (while appointment of the director of a state 
institution as representative payee for an institutionalized recipient is not improper per se, such appointment 
Often creates an inherent conflict of interest, because of the institution's usual dual role of "creditor [and] 
caretaker," citing Tidwell v. Weinberger, [Fed. nansfer Binder Jan. 1976-Jan. 1977] Unempl. Ins. Rep. 
(CCH) 114,756 (N.D. Ill., June 23, 1976). 
202But see, Woodall v. Bartolino, Civil No. 85-1781 (MTB) (D.N.J., Oct. 24, 1985), discussed infra at text 
accompanying notes 216-231. 
203See 42 U.S.C. §407 (1983). 
204A new section of this statute is explicit: 
No other provision of Jaw, enacted before, on or after the date of the enactment of this section, 
may be construed to limit, supercede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except 
to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section. 
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In the lead case of Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board,205 the Supreme 
Court rejected a county's efforts to obtain bank account funds206 consisting of 
Social Security disability benefits so as to partially off set county welfare pay-
ments. 201 "We see no reason," ruled the court, "why a state, performing its 
statutory duty to take care of the needy, should be in a preferred position as 
compared with any other creditor." It construed §407 as imposing "a broad bar 
against the use of any legal process to reach all social security benefits."208 
There has been some dispute in the Circuits as to the application of §407 to 
care and maintenance situations.209 The Fifth Circuit distinguished Philpott in a 
case involving a chronic institutionalized and adjudicated incompetent patient 
who possessed over $40,000 in social security and veterans' benefits.210 Because 
the state was meeting all of the recipient's needs (and would have to do so for 
the remainder of the patient's life), the patient's guardian would never have the 
opportunity to use the benefits for her ward's care; thus, allowing attachment 
would not circumvent the purpose of the benefits program, which was to pro-
vide for the care and maintenance of the recipient. 21 1 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has upheld §407's broad exclusion in a 
case striking down the use of a standard consent form through which a state 
hospital asked patients to authorize the facility to reimburse itself for hospital-
ization costs from the patient's Social Security benefits. 212 
In that case, the form failed to clearly inform individual patients that their 
reimbursement decision was, in reality, a voluntary one, that the hospital would 
provide them with treatment even if they refused to sign, and that their benefits 
were not otherwise subject to the legal process .213 
This conflict was, in great measure, resolved in 1983 when the Social Security 
Act was amended to include §407(b), which stated explicitly that §407(a) could 
42 U.S.C. §407 (b) (1983) ("§407(b)"). 
SSI benefits are also covered by these provisions. 42 U.S.C. §1383 (d) (I) (1985 Supp.). See also, 20 C.F.R . 
§404.1820 (1985). 
205409 U.S. 413 (1973). 
206Cf, e.g., Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co. 370 U.S . 159, 162 (1962) (veterans' benefits deposited in savings 
and loan association on veteran's behalf retained the "qualities of moneys" and was not a non-exempt 
permanent investment, quoting Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 (1933)) . See infra note 210. 
207Philpott, 409 U.S. at 415- 417. 
208Id. at 416,417. 
209See generally Part lll(A), supra. 
210Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Davis, 616 F. 2d 828,829 (5 Cir. 1980) (Davis II) . The patient 
had been institutionalized in public facilities for nearly thirty years . Id. at 830. 
211 Id. at 215-216. Davis II thus distinguished Philpott, where the non-institutionalized welfare recipient 
was at least partially responsible for his own care. See 409 U.S. at 415-417 . 
212Tidwell v. Schweiker, 677 F. 2d 560, 566-568 (7 Cir. 1982). 
213Id. at 563-564. 
In other fact settings, federal courts have interpreted §407 strictly to protect bank accounts from garnish-
ment where Social Security funds may have been intermingled with other moneys, see, e.g., Fiberg v. 
Sullivan, 634 F. 2d 50 (3 Cir. 1980); see also Reigh v. Schleigh, 595 F. Supp. 1535, 1555 n.15 (D. Md. 1984); 
Dionne v. Bouley, 583 F. Supp. 307, 319 (D.R .!. 1984), afj'd 757 F. 2d 1344 (1 Cir. 1985); Deary v. Guardian 
Loan C:o., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 1178, 1187-1188 (S .D.N .Y. ·1982), and to protect such benefits from recoupment 
followmg past overpayments, see McKenzie v. Heckler, 605 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 (D. Minn. 1985); see also 
Page v. Heckler, 596 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D . Pa. 1984); McDaniels v. Heckler, 571 F. Supp. 80 (D . Md . 1983); 
Ellender v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N .Y. 1983). 
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be modified only by express reference. 214 The legislative history to this amended 
section is unambiguous: 
Since 1935 the Social Security Act has prohibited the transfer or 
assignment of any future social security or SSI benefits payable and 
further states that no money payable or rights existing under the Act 
shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment or other 
legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency 
law. 
Based on the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, some bankruptcy courts have considered social security and 
SSI benefits listed by the debtor to be income for purposes of a 
Chapter XIII bankruptcy and have ordered [the Social Security Ad-
ministration] in several hundred cases to send all or part of a debtor's 
benefit check to the trustee in bankruptcy. 
Your Committee's bill specifically provides that social security and 
SSI benefits may not be assigned notwithstanding any other provi-
sions of law, including P.L. 95-598, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978.215 
This backdrop has been recently carefully examined in Woodall v. Barto-
lino, 216 where plaintiffs sought, inter alia, 211 a declaration that the benefits in 
Question were exempt from attachment by county officials to pay for their care 
and maintenance at a state psychiatric hospital. 21 8 In finding that the benefits 
Were so exempt, 219 the district court specifically found that, if Davis II (the Fifth 
Circuit case which had allowed for attachment)220 "has continuing life, ... it 
[must be] limited to the extreme factual situation presented ... in that case."22 1 
214See supra note 204. 
215H.R. Rep, No. 98-25, 98th Cong., Jst Sess. 82-83 (1983); see also House Conj Rep., No . 98-47, 98th 
Cong., !st Sess. 153 (1983). 
This amendment has been construed to explicitly supercede cases where bankruptcy courts had ordered the 
use of Social Security benefits to pay creditors, see Matter of Treadwell, 699 F. 2d 1050, 1053 (11 Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Decal/, 704 F. 2d 1513, 1516 (11 Cir. 1983). 
216Civil No. 85-1781 (MTB) (D.N.J., Oct. 24, 1985). 
217See id. at 22-24. 
218 Woodall, slip op. at 2. The Woodall class consisted of " I) all Mercer County residents receiving Social 
Security benefits who have been or in the future will be hospitalized in a New Jersey state psychiatric 
institution and who have been or in the future will be ordered to pay for their hospitalizations from their 
Social Security benefits, and 2) all persons who now act or in the future will act as representative payees for 
such Mercer County residents." Id. 
Id. 
219/d. at 12-22 . 
iwsee supra text accompanying notes 215. 
22 1 Woodall, slip op. at J 7: 
The individual in Davis [fl] had been in state institutions for almost thirty years, had long been 
judged incompetent, had little hope of ever emerging from the institution in which he resided, 
and his guardian had accumulated a large amount of funds which, because of this individual's 
situation, would almost certainly ~ever be used for his care and maintenance, unless they were 
turned over to the state which was providing for his care and maintenance and had been for 
years. Here, of course, plaintiff Alfreda K. has been intermittently institutionalized and other-
wise resides with plaintiff Woodall . 
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Although the court found it appropriate that a portion of plaintiffs' soci~l 
security benefits be utilized to pay for patients' care and maintenance costs, it 
specified that it was the responsibility of the federal government (not the state) 
to enforce a representative payee's duties, and that this enforcement was limited 
to liability for the misuse of funds and the appointment of a new payee.222 ?n 
the other hand, institutional care payments "for the beneficiary's current mam-
tenance"223 are appropriate224 and may include-in cases where the recipient is 
institutionalized for "mental or physical incapacity"225 - "the customary charges 
in the institution."226 
Thus, the court concluded that, while defendants may not use the power of 
state courts to enforce the application of Social Security benefits for the care 
and maintenance of an institutionalized individual, it would nonetheless be 
"appropriate" for these benefits to be applied to a patient's care and mainte-
nance. 221 
Procedurally, the court found it appropriate for defendant Bartolino228 . to 
convene a "non-adversarial" hearing in conformity with state statute, to in-
quire into the willingness and ability ~f a representative payee ·to pay a sum out 
of social security benefits towards the cost of a patient's care and mainte-
nance: 229 
While the representative payee has discretion in this regard, and while 
it may be quite clear that, for a variety of reasons, nothing or some-
thing can or should be contributed, the exercise of that discretion can 
be reviewed and enforced by the District Office [of the Social Security 
Administration] and not by defendant Bartolino or by the state 
courts.•j0 
The court thus entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting defendants from 
enforcing judicial orders for care and maintenance against the plaintiffs' Social 
Security benefits. 231 
222/d. at 18, citing 20 C.F.R. §404.2041 (1985); 404.2050 (1985). 
22320 C.F.R. §404.2040(a) (1985). 
224 Woodall, slip op. at 18. 
22520 C.F.R. §404.2040(b) (1985). 
226/d. 
227 Woodall, slip op . at 21: 
Thus, while such payments must be voluntary, it is nonetheless clear that a representative payee 
has a responsibility, if it is possible to do so, to make such payments, a responsibility and 
exercise of discretion the violation of which can be enforced by removing the representative 
payee and, perhaps, naming as payee the institution caring for the payment. See 220 C.F.R. 
§§404.2041, 404.2050, 416.601(a)(2}. 
Id. Cf Cabinet for Human Resources, supra. 
228Named defendant Bartlolino was the county adjuster, the official responsible for investigating the 
financial ability of patients and their relatives to pay for the costs of institutionalization, and for serving as 
the "referee" for the purpose of taking testimony on that question. Woodall, slip op . at 8; see N.JS.A . 30:4-
34 (1981); see generally, N.JS.A . 44:1-1 (1940), and N.JS.A. 44:7-1 (1980 Supp.}. 
229 Woodall, slip op . at 21. 
230/d. at 21 - 22. 
23 1/d. at 22- 23. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The above discussion reveals, at best, a "mixed bag" of caselaw. While several 
?Pinions reflect serious decision-making on the part of the courts, 232 most 
1
~volve simply workman-like constructions of older statutory schemes, with 
httle consideration paid to the parallel constitutional and statutory develop-
~ents in other areas of patients' rights law. 233 Rarely are the collateral economic 
issues- those related to ex-patient self-sufficiency in the community and the 
relationship between lack of deinstitutionalization planning to post-hospitaliza-
tion homelessness- considered, and, only in a few cases- notably Vecchione, 
Chill, and the unreported Woodall decision-is there a sense that the courts 
were looking at the economic issues as part of the larger fabric of the constitu-
tional and civil rights of the institutionalized. 234 
It is somewhat difficult to attempt to discern doctrinal threads or trends in 
this group of cases. That difficulty is probably a reflection of the reality that the 
cases were decided episodically and idiosyncratically, and not with any strong 
sense (on the part of the courts) that the entire body of patients' rights law is 
one which is in significant flux. 235 To some extent, this is probably a reflection of 
the fact that few of the cases appear to be the result of conscious, affirmative 
law reform litigation. 236 This may help account for the fact that- even in those 
ar~as in which constitutional principles have been shaped- there has been sur-
Pnsingly little "follow-up" litigation in other jurisdictions following the initial 
decision. 237 
It is also unclear as to what paths further litigation in this area will take. Any 
Prediction here is dependent on several paradoxical variables: a legislative coun-
tertrend which is resulting in the re-loosening of civil commitment criteria in 
many states (as a reflection that the "pendulum" has "swung too far" toward the 
232£.g., Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, supra, discussed in Part II(A), supra; Chill v. Mississippi Reimburse-
ment Commission, supra, discussed in Part JII(C), supra; Woodall v. Bartolino, supra, discussed in Part V, 
supra. 
233See, e.g. , sources cited supra note 4. 
23
'E.g. , in Vecchione, the court looked carefully at the implications of the presumption of incompetency; in 
Chill, the court took note of the substantive and procedural due process decisions which have significantly 
altered the relationship between patients and hospitals; in Woodall, the court showed sensitivity to the special 
Problems of the "intermittently institutionalized" patient. 
235See generally Last Frontier, supra note 4. For an example, see the sharp contrast in the way the Courts of 
Appeals have considered whether or not there is a right to community treatment following the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S . 307 (1982), and Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). Compare, e.g., Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F. 2d 367 (4 Cir. 1986), cert. 
den . 106 S. Ct. 1992 (1986), and Clark v. Cohen, 794 F. 2d 79 (3 Cir. 1986), cert. den. 55 U.S.L.W. 3358 (1986) 
(applying the right), to Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F. 2d 1239 (2 Cir. 1984) 
and Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F. 2d 365 (7 Cir. 1983) (refusing to apply the right). 
236 Vecchione is a clear exception . For a comprehensive analysis of a prototypical law reform case involving 
the right of institutionalized patients' to treatment, see, e.g., Jones & Parlour, eds., WYATT V. STICKNEY: 
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT (1981). But see, Stevens," Wyatt v. Stickney Concludes With A Whimper," 
11 MENT. & PHYS. DIS. L. RPTR. 139 (1987). On the question of law reform and public law litigation in 
general, see, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge on Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); 
Johnson, The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 ALABAMA L. REV. 271 (1981). 
237See, e.g., supra notes 25, 44. 
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"civil liberties-model" in cases such as Lessard v. Schmidt),238 at the same time 
that federal legislation is making available (for the first time) funds to each state 
to develop "Protection and Advocacy Systems" to provide representation to the 
institutionalized mentally disabled ·239 the increased hostility on the part of 
' . 
many federal courts toward the idea of mental disability law reform240 at a time 
when litigants are beginning to approach state courts as a preferred forum for 
civil rights litigation on behalf of the population in question;241 the realization 
that, no matter what treatment and social advances are made in coping with the 
problems raised by deinstitutionalization, 242 economic issues must be given 
equal consideration in any attempts to grapple with problems of the homeles~- 243 
While these issues are still being sorted out, it is clear that the underlying 
economic issues will not disappear. Although this has not been a major priority 
for attorneys litigating on behalf of the mentally disabled, for legislators, for 
policy-makers, or for mental disability professionals, the issues are important 
and timeless ones. If the mega-issues of treatment and deinstitutionalization are 
to be effectively resolved, it is necessary that the meta-issue of economic rights 
be, once and for all, taken seriously. 
238The use of the "pendulum" metaphor has grown exponentially in recent years . See, e.g., Durham & 
LaFond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil 
Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL. REV. 395, 398 (1985) ("the pendulum of public attitudes and state policy is 
swinging again"); Myers, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A System in Need of Change, 29 
VILL. L. REV. 367, 379 (1983-84) ("the pendulum may have swung too far"); Shuman, Innovative Statutory 
Approaches to Civil Commitment: An Overview and Critique," 13 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 284, 286 
(1985) ("Now, it appears the swing toward dangerousness as an all exclusive criterion for commitment of the 
mentally ill has reached the height of its arc and has begun to reverse directions"). 
239See the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act, 42 U.S.C. §10801 el seq. (1986 Supp.) 
(Pamph. Ill). 
240See generally "Last Frontier," supra note 4. See, e.g., Le/sz v. Kavanagh, 807 F. 2d 1243 (5 Cir. 1987), 




1The prototype recent case is Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y. 2d 485,504 N.Y.S. 2d 74,495 N.E. 2d 337 (Ct. App. 
~~86) (right to refuse treatment under state constitution), discussed extensively in "Last Frontier," supra note 
2
•
2See, e.g., Lehmann, Possidente & Hawken, The Quality of Life of Chronic Patients in a Stale hospital 
and m Community Residences, 37 HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCH. 901 (1986). 
243See, e.g., Kanter, Homeless Mentally Ill People: No Longer Out of Sight or Out of Mind, 3 N. Y.L.S. 
HUM. RTS. ANN. 331 (1986). 
